A Novel Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Internet Consumer Financial Regulation

Due to many social problems caused by Internet consumer finance, Internet consumer finance regulation has always become one of the main concerns of governments and society. Based on a novel three-dimensional mixed strategy game matrix, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for regulators, Internet consumer financial institutions, and consumers. In this model, we establish the dynamic replication equation of the three parties above, analyze the influence of factors on the tripartite strategy selection and discuss the stability of model equilibrium points through numerical simulation. The results show that the model will get six evolutionary stable points in Internet consumer financial regulation under different conditions. Moreover, strict regulation, verification, and contract keeping are the most ideal evolutionarily stable strategies. In addition, three critical factors affect the evolution results of the three parties, namely losses to institutions caused by loose regulation and verification, punishment for loose verification under strict regulation, and losses from breaking the contract.