TWO ACCOUNTS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE: HISTORIOGRAPHIC REASONING AND NARRATIVE ACCORDING TO AVIEZER TUCKER AND CHIEL VAN DEN AKKER1

ABSTRACT

This review essay examines a recurring distinction in the philosophy of history between the phase of establishing historical facts or knowledge claims and the phase of interpreting them. Focusing on two recent books by Aviezer Tucker and Chiel van den Akker, it analyzes how each author conceptualizes historical knowledge by emphasizing one of these phases. Tucker locates the core of historical practice in evidential reasoning and the production of knowledge claims about past events, which he regards as the basis for consensus among historians. In contrast, van den Akker concentrates on the construction and understanding of narrative theses and argues that historical narratives are not direct descriptions of evidence but unique interpretations. This review essay argues that, although the distinction between research and interpretation can be somewhat useful, an attempt to synthesize Tucker's and van den Akker's accounts into a single and more comprehensive theory of historical knowledge would be problematic. Since each framework highlights one phase and leaves the other underdeveloped, a meaningful theory of historical work must be developed internally within one conceptual framework rather than assembled from incompatible accounts with distinct priorities.