The politics of giving back: How historical reciprocity and self-interest shape the South Korean public’s aid priorities

An implicit assumption in the literature is that donors recently transitioning from recipients emphasize distinct foreign aid priorities. To what extent does this assumption reflect public preferences? This paper examines public aid priorities through a single-country study of South Korea. I show that although individuals may feel a moral obligation to repay past assistance, perceptions that their country is not sufficiently affluent may also lead them to favor aid that promises significant donor benefits at a low cost. Using a conjoint experiment, I find that support increases when packages signal higher national-interest gains, involve lower amounts, and target countries that assisted South Korea during the Korean War. Further analyses show that self-interest and reciprocity operate as substitutes and that cost-sensitivity is moderated by strategic, but not by reciprocal, considerations. The findings highlight the role of a donor’s developmental trajectory, providing implications for framing aid narratives to build domestic support.