The Paradox of Peace

Abstract

The Paradox of Peace offers the first comprehensive, interdisciplinary examination of Egyptian–Israeli relations from Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977 peace initiative through the end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in 2011. It explores the central paradox of Egypt’s sustained, strategic cooperation with Israel at the state level alongside deep and persistent opposition to normalization at the societal level. Despite major regional crises and internal challenges, genuine normalization has remained elusive—yet the strategic peace proved to be stable for over four decades. At the heart of the book is an inquiry into why Egypt’s peace with Israel matured into a stable strategic partnership without progressing toward warmer, more integrated relations. Combining political and intellectual history with peace and conflict studies, the book charts the evolution of peace across different historical phases and distinguishes between its multiple dimensions: “cold,” “strategic,” and “warm” peace. It introduces a new conceptual framework that differentiates between utilitarian normalization at the intergovernmental level, and cultural normalization at the societal level, offering a novel lens through which to assess the Egyptian–Israeli relationship. Anchored in a wide array of primary sources in Arabic, Hebrew, and English—including government documents, press coverage, interviews, memoirs, and archival material—the book brings new evidence and interpretations to the fore. Throughout, the study emphasizes the interplay between Egypt’s strategic interests and its Arab and Palestinian commitments, as well as the psychological and ideological barriers that have prevented deeper reconciliation with Israel, but not the establishment of a stable peace.