DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70088 ISSN: 0362-9805

The Leadership Premium: Committee Leadership Status and Political Donations to Incumbent Legislators in South Korea

Sinjae Kang, Kyungrim Chung

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effect of committee leadership positions on political fundraising in the South Korean National Assembly from 2004 to 2019. Drawing upon theories of legislative power and campaign finance, we examine whether acquiring standing committee chairmanships significantly increases political contributions received by legislators, even within Korea's highly restrictive regulatory regime that prohibits corporate donations. Utilizing OLS regression and difference‐in‐differences with Panel Matching methodology, we find compelling evidence of a substantial leadership premium. OLS estimates reveal that committee chairs consistently outraise non‐chairs by 16%–21%; Panel Matching estimates confirm an immediate increase of approximately 1.15 log‐points (a 216% increase) following chair appointment. Event study analysis validates our identification strategy by demonstrating parallel pre‐trends and sharp treatment effects at the moment of leadership transition, with effects dissipating after chairs leave their positions. Split‐sample OLS estimates reveal a cross‐over pattern: the premium is significant for Targeted and Mixed committees in the first half of the legislative term but shifts to Universal committees in the second half, suggesting that the relevant dimension of heterogeneity may be whether a committee holds jurisdictional authority over concentrated regulatory or budgetary stakes. These findings demonstrate that the link between institutional power and political money persists even under highly restrictive campaign finance regimes—reflecting structural features of legislative organization that transcend specific regulatory designs. The individual‐as‐proxy mechanism we identify, whereby organized interest groups circumvent the corporate donation ban through coordinated individual‐level contributions, suggests that regulation reshapes the channels of strategic giving without eliminating its underlying demand.

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