The Israeli campaign between the wars concept: Evolution, scope, and limitations

The Campaign Between the Wars (CBW) is one of the central concepts of contemporary Israeli security strategy, developed in response to the evolving threats Israel has faced since the beginning of the 21st century. Rather than adhering to the traditional dichotomy between war and peace, Israeli strategic thinking has gradually adopted an approach that views the space between major conflicts as an active operational arena. The core logic of the CBW lies in continuous action below the threshold of open warfare, aimed at preventing or slowing the accumulation of adversary capabilities, delaying the outbreak of larger conflicts, and shaping favourable conditions should war ultimately occur. The concept took its modern form in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when it became evident that non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah and Hamas, could develop significant offensive capabilities during periods of relative calm. In response, the Israel Defence Forces developed a multidomain model integrating intelligence activities, precision airstrikes, cyber operations, special operations, and diplomatic engagement. In this sense, the CBW functions as a proactive instrument for shaping the security environment rather than merely reacting to emerging threats. From a theoretical perspective, the concept draws on elements from several classical schools of strategic thought. It incorporates Sun Tzu's emphasis on achieving victory without decisive battle, Douhet's logic of striking deep into the enemy's system, and Liddell Hart's indirect approach. At the same time, it departs from Clausewitz's paradigm of war as a clearly bounded event culminating in decisive victory. Instead, Israeli practice points toward a model of sustained, controlled, and often covert use of force. Operationally, the CBW has been most prominently applied in Syria, where Israel has conducted continuous strikes against Iranian infrastructure and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, aiming to prevent the emergence of a new front in the North. A similar logic has been applied in relation to Lebanon and Iran's broader regional presence. In the Gaza Strip, however, specific structural conditions-high population density, immediate proximity to Israeli territory, and a low threshold for escalation-have limited the consistent application of the concept. Although the CBW has, in many cases, enabled Israel to maintain operational initiative, delay conflicts, and degrade adversary capabilities at relatively low cost, its limitations have also become apparent. Prolonged reliance on below-threshold operations carries the risk of misjudging adversary intentions, gradual erosion of deterrence, and the accumulation of threats that may ultimately escape control. Contemporary analyses, therefore, suggest that while the CBW is an effective instrument for managing threats in the grey zone, it cannot serve as a substitute for classical strategic preparation for war. Although the analysis focuses on the period before October 2023, an understanding of the Campaign Between the Wars concept is essential for a systematic examination of contemporary Israeli strategic thinking and the manner in which Israel shapes its security environment, thereby facilitating a more comprehensive assessment of both its current and prospective strategic conduct.