The Impact of Misreporting by Construction Enterprises on the Construction Waste Recycling Supply Chain Under Government Subsidies

Numerous construction enterprises have insufficient efficiency in resource utilization for construction and demolition waste (CDW), restricting global circular economic development. How to improve resource utilization has become an urgent problem. While existing studies have extensively explored operational decisions in CDW resource supply chains, insufficient attention has been given to construction enterprises’ information misreporting and its interaction with on-site conversion efficiency. This paper aims to elucidate the mechanism of action of misreporting and systematically analyzes its effects on the pricing decisions of the CDW supply chain. Drawing on information misreporting theory, this study constructs a Stackelberg game model involving construction firms and recycled building materials manufacturers, and compares supply chain decision-making behaviors under two scenarios: information misreporting and honest disclosure. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) misreporting alters recycled building material pricing and profit distribution by affecting manufacturers’ supply capacity expectations; (2) higher on-site conversion efficiency enhances CDW treatment ability and affects stakeholders’ profits; and (3) misreporting is related to on-site conversion efficiency and onsite conversion costs—enterprises prefer misreporting for short-term gains under low on-site conversion efficiency or high costs, while higher on-site conversion efficiency makes truthful disclosure conducive to long-term stable returns. This paper reveals the CDW supply chain decision-making mechanism from enterprises’ perspective, providing a new theoretical basis and practical value for CDW utilization and supply chain optimization.