The Hamiltonian Pseudorandom Function: A Symmetric Encryption Primitive Grounded in Symplectic Geometry and Chaotic Dynamics

We introduce the Hamiltonian pseudorandom function (HPRF), a new symmetric cryptographic primitive in which the function family {Fk} is defined by Fk(q)=∇Sk(q), the gradient of the generating function of a secret Lagrangian submanifold Lk on the symplectic torus T2n. The key k specifies a composition of kicked-rotor maps in the strongly chaotic regime, whose classical Lyapunov exponents grow as log(K/2) per kick. The HPRF is best understood as a seeded one-way function with high min-entropy output: Fk is smooth (C∞), so its raw output is not directly usable as a uniform keystream, but it is computationally hard to invert. We construct three symmetric encryption modes—Mode A (key-dependent coordinate frame), Mode C (Lagrangian keystream), and Mode AC (hybrid)—in which the HPRF supplies the hardness and a key derivation function (HKDF) supplies bit-level uniformity. Standard symmetric composition then yields IND-CPA and IND-CCA2 security. Classical security reduces to the Lagrangian identification problem (LIP), shown as equivalent to the Hamiltonian inversion problem of recovering the kick parameters, which we state as an explicit hardness assumption supported by a precision/sample-complexity obstruction from the positive Lyapunov exponents, by the empirical failure of concrete attacks, and (more heuristically) by topological suggestiveness from the Arnold conjecture and Floer theory. We validate a gradient-fitting attack and an algebraic-structure attack and show that both fail. For quantum security, we propose what we believe is the right framing: that the composed Floquet operator U^Kr is a candidate pseudorandom unitary (PRU) in the sense of Ji–Liu–Song. We provide three independent pillars of evidence—Wigner–Dyson spectral statistics, Lyapunov-rate scrambling, and conjectural approximate-design behaviour—and reduce the HPRF quantum security to the PRU conjecture for U^Kr. We then retire the dynamical-localisation argument of previous drafts as inapplicable at cryptographic parameters; the chaotic-pseudorandomness regime that the operator actually inhabits is, we argue, a stronger foundation than the one that localisation would have provided. A deterministic fixed-point arithmetic core ensures cross-platform bit-exact consistency. A reference implementation validates correctness across all modes, and an NIST SP 800-90B analysis of the output min-entropy fixes the parameter sets. As a foundational proposal, the HPRF is intended for settings that seek a symmetric hardness assumption structurally independent of the algebraic problems underlying current cryptography, for example, as a hedge primitive in defence-in-depth designs, or as a basis for further study of geometry- and chaos-based cryptography, rather than as a drop-in replacement for AES or lattice-based schemes at this stage.