The Concept of Harm in Medical Ethics

ABSTRACT

The concept of harm is central to medical ethics. In particular, it is frequently used in ethical deliberation about clinical cases and harm‐benefit analyses. Despite its significance, there has been surprisingly little discussion in practice about conceptual approaches and the nature of harm in medical ethics analyses. We examine how different conceptual accounts of harm shape ethical decision making through examples from clinical ethics consultation and data‐intensive medical innovations. By applying three prevailing theoretical‐philosophical frameworks—the counterfactual, temporal, and non‐comparative accounts of harm—to these cases, we demonstrate that explicitly identifying and discussing stakeholders' varying concepts of harm is crucial for ethical analyses in medicine and healthcare. While harm is only one of many considerations influencing medical ethics decision‐making, our analysis reveals that different conceptualisations of harm can lead to substantively different practical outcomes. In this way, how we understand harm can affect recommendation processes, stakeholder communication, and assessments of quality of life and best interests. Without making different types of harm explicit, stakeholders might talk past each other when weighing harm against benefit, as what constitutes harm in one case may not be considered harm in another. We argue that explicit consideration of the nature of harm ensures comprehensive ethical deliberation, and integrates multiple perspectives in healthcare settings. Our findings suggest that the ethical importance of conceptual analysis of harm extends beyond mere theoretical interest, with direct implications for clinical practice and ethical decision making in healthcare.