The “Communal College:” Cross‐Ethnic Voting Rules and Census Requirements for Dyadic Consociational Democracies

Abstract

Electoral systems in deeply divided societies are pivotal for peace and stability among ethno‐national groups. Consociationalism and centripetalism are the most widespread approaches from which derive the major incentives for electoral systems in deeply divided, dyadic societies. The article discusses electoral dysfunctionalities in dyadic societies and defends a new electoral system which incorporates centripetal cross‐ethnic voting elements to be applied to consociational power‐sharing arrangements. In order to prevent the largest ethnic groups from electing representatives of dominant minority groups to collective institutions, this electoral system offers a safeguard mechanism through electoral weights aligned with population census. The model is based on the conceptual framework of power‐sharing democracies in deeply divided societies. To test the validity and necessity of this electoral model, this paper compares the regional cases of Bern, Cyprus, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.