The Blind Spots of Aid Evaluation: Why Do Some Departments Capture Unintended Effects Better Than Others?

ABSTRACT

This study examines why some evaluation agencies and departments of bilateral aid donors report more unintended effects than others. It does so by analysing Belgian, Dutch and German evaluation practices. Using a comparative political economy approach, it evaluates the rigour and independence vis‐à‐vis implementers of their systems. Findings show that evaluation systems designed to actively detect unintended effects do identify more of them. Departments and agencies that are structurally separated from the aid implementers find relatively more than two times as much negative unintended effects than those agencies that are embedded within the aid implementer's structure. The study shows (1) how institutional commitment shapes attention to unintended effects and that (2) independence vis‐à‐vis aid implementers contributes to more reporting on negative unintended effects.