State intervention in energy crises: comparative evidence from France and Nigeria

Introduction: Energy poverty remains a persistent and evolving challenge within liberalized energy markets, particularly during periods of crisis. Existing analytical frameworks offer important normative and institutional insights, yet they are often applied in isolation, limiting their capacity to explain the complex interactions between State intervention, market dynamics, and governance across multiple scales.

Materials and methods: This paper addresses this gap by developing and applying what we call the SEM Paradoxes Framework, an integrative analytical model that synthesizes perspectives from social contract theory, energy justice, and multi-level governance (SEM). Using a qualitative comparative case study of France (EU) and Nigeria (ECOWAS) the study examines government's responses during the core 2019–2023 crisis period across three tensions: energy as a commodity vs. a public good; State intervention vs. market liberalization; and supranational vs. national governance. Evidence from 2024-2026 is incorporated where relevant to trace how crisis induced interventions evolved, were adjusted, or continued to shape energy policy in the post crisis period.

Results: The findings demonstrate that crisis conditions often trigger a temporary rebalancing toward stronger State intervention and greater emphasis on energy as a public good. However, the extent and durability of these shifts are shaped by differences in fiscal capacity, institutional arrangements, and the structural constraints of liberalized markets.

Conclusions: By moving beyond single-framework analyses, the SEM Paradoxes Framework offers a replicable political economy approach for understanding how liberalized energy systems negotiate competing demands of affordability, efficiency, equity, and governance under conditions of crisis and transition.