Spinozism of Deleuze, Simondon, and Balibar: immanence, transduction, the imaginary, and the problem of moralism

The revival of Spinozism in French philosophy is often interpreted as a unified project of radical immanence. However, behind this facade lie conceptual disagreements that are only revealed when comparing Deleuze, Simondon, and Balibar. It is these divergences, rather than similarities, that form the productive core of the Spinozist legacy. Immanence in Deleuze blurs the line between the real and the imaginary. Simondon's transduction offers an operational transition from the pre-individual to structure. The imaginary, which Balibar reintroduces into politics, Deleuze systematically excludes. The problem of moralism shifts from accusation to the question: can immanent philosophy do without normative judgment, and what remains of responsibility in that case? The answer to this question cannot be found within a single approach. Only by maintaining their conceptual tension can we avoid both naive nihilism and the restoration of hidden transcendence. The novelty of the approach lies in the refusal to seek a single "Spinozism" and the transition to an analysis of the productive tension between the three thinkers. Instead of reconciling their positions, we show how Deleuze's radical ethics of encounter clashes with Simondon's processual ontology, and how both of these lines are problematized by Balibar's theory of "transindividuality," with its emphasis on imaginary institutions. Methodologically, the study is constructed as a triple optical assembly. First, the ontological basis of each author is reconstructed, then key points of divergence are identified, and finally, these divergences are projected onto the political question of how a free multitude is possible. The relevance of this work is accentuated by the fact that today, as discussions about collective action, digital platforms, and new forms of power require a reevaluation of classical categories of subject and agency, the Spinozist tradition offers vibrant conceptual tools. However, these tools can only be taken with an understanding of their internal conflict. The article insists that a genuine dialogue with the legacy of Benedict Spinoza is impossible without maintaining this methodological and ethical tension, where immanence demands a norm, transduction seeks its limit, and the notion of the "imaginary" reminds us of itself even in the strictest theory of power. Acknowledging this tension does not paralyze thought, but, on the contrary, gives it the necessary sharpness for analyzing contemporary regimes of sensibility and power.