Sales Mode Selection and Information-Sharing Strategy for Green E-Commerce Supply Chain

With the rapid development of E-commerce platforms (EPs) and the accumulation of consumer data, demand information sharing has become increasingly important in green supply chains. However, the interaction between selling mode selection and information-sharing strategies remains insufficiently explored. This study develops a game-theoretic model for a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an EP to examine selling modes and information-sharing decisions under reselling and agency modes. The results indicate that information sharing is highly dependent on information accuracy. Specifically, when information accuracy exceeds a threshold, the manufacturer no longer purchases demand information because the marginal benefit cannot compensate for the acquisition cost. Under the reselling mode, the EP shares information only when information accuracy falls within an intermediate range, whereas under the agency mode, it always chooses to share information due to additional information-sharing revenue. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agency mode when the service cost performance factor is below the critical threshold and switches to the reselling mode otherwise. Information sharing consistently improves environmental performance, while the preferred selling mode depends on the service cost performance factor. The extension further shows that introducing an information collection cost narrows the information-sharing region and weakens the EP’s incentive to share information.