Robust backdoor attacks against fine-tuning-based transfer learning via self-attention distillation
Ziyang Zhuo, Yilun Lyu, Xu Ma, Yuan Ma, Hongwei Zhou, Jiankang WeiBackdoor attacks inject hidden behaviors into deep neural networks, causing them to behave normally on benign inputs but produce attacker-specified results under trigger conditions, which poses significant threats to model integrity. However, transfer learning, as a prevalent paradigm for training neural networks, often compromises backdoors during the fine-tuning process. To address this issue, we propose Robust Backdoor Attacks against Fine-tuning-based Transfer Learning via Self-Attention Distillation (RBA-SAD), a robust backdoor attack scheme that manipulates model’s ability to recognize the trigger via layer-wise and top-down self-attention distillation, effectively withstanding the impact of fine-tuning. Additionally, imperceptible noise is employed as a trigger to evade defenses based on input purification. To enhance the effectiveness of self-attention distillation, we optimize trigger generation to achieve multi-layer feature collisions, ensuring that the representations of poisoned samples at each corresponding layer are similar to those of clean samples. Extensive experiments on three benchmark transfer-learning tasks show that RBA-SAD achieves over 97% attack success rate while remaining stealthy against seven state-of-the-art backdoor defenses. Moreover, it generalizes well to additional settings, including Vision Transformers, ImageNet-scale transfers, and parameter-efficient fine-tuning with Low-Rank Adaptation.