Revisiting the Authoritative/Formal Distinction

Distinguishing between authoritative and formal normativity is a staple component in the metanormative literature. Norms such as morality and prudence count as genuinely or authoritatively normative, while those norms concocted on the spot are only formally normative. In this article, I question the common reliance on a monolithic divide between these two kinds of normativity. First, I argue that the same kind of skepticism that plagues the adjacent concept of an ought simpliciter applies equally to a definition of ‘authoritativeness’. Second, I point out the limits of primitivist responses to this challenge of developing a proper definition. Due to the abundance of intuitive differences between paradigmatic instances of authoritative and formal normativity, glossing at intuition is insufficient to demarcate authoritative normativity. Finally, I provide some motivation for abandoning the dualist orthodoxy and eschewing a monolithic understanding of the authoritative/formal divide in favor of a form of metanormative pluralism: there are multiple dimensions along which one might describe norms as being either authoritative or formal.