Research on Early Warning Threshold Setting for Inventory Pledge Financing Under Supervisory Credit Restructuring

From the perspective of supervisory credit reconstruction, this study proposes the setting of early warning points. It employs a combined approach of evolutionary game theory and the stochastic cusp model to calculate the replenishment point and liquidation point, and simulates the impact of disruptive factors on these two points. The study reveals that: (1) The optimal equilibrium in the game between the two parties is reached when the 3PL enterprise chooses to positive supervise, the financial institution opts not to provide incentives, and instead relies on penalty deterrence, market discipline, and reputation mechanisms to ensure the 3PL enterprise implements active supervision activities; (2) During the evolutionary process of supervision, whether a sudden change in supervisory behavior occurs is determined by the bifurcation point of the stochastic cusp catastrophe model, which in turn dictates the settings of the replenishment and liquidation points; (3) The 3PL enterprise’s negative supervision penalty and the 3PL enterprise’s reputational loss are positively correlated with the replenishment point and negatively correlated with the liquidation point. This study provides theoretical and methodological support for supervisory credit reconstruction and quantitative implementation, which bolsters financial institutions’ confidence in inventory pledge financing and promotes the development of inclusive finance.