Replicability and Epistemological and Methodological Bias
Julia Schnepf, Norbert GroebenSummary
Replicability is a central criterion in scientific inquiry, with particular emphasis on psychological research. It involves conceptual and methodological distinctions from reproducibility, while remaining closely interdependent with it. Ongoing challenges arise from contextual variability as well as epistemological and methodological biases. Debates surrounding the replication crisis in psychology have drawn attention to underlying epistemological assumptions, including reductive conceptions of human subjects, and to forms of methodological confirmation bias operating at both individual and systemic levels. At the same time, dominant empirical paradigms have been critiqued for prioritizing experimental control and statistical significance over reflexivity and processes of meaning-making. Examples from perceptual psychology, framing effects, and applied action research illustrate how methodological choices actively shape research outcomes. These considerations support calls for methodological pluralism that integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches, balances epistemic and practical research aims, and attends to both internal and ecological validity. Addressing the replication crisis thus entails not only technical adjustments but also a broader epistemological reorientation toward forms of psychological inquiry that remain rigorous while engaging the complexity of their subject matter.