Regulatory Capture, Public Trust and Pro‐Environmental Behaviors

ABSTRACT

Regulatory capture, where special interests steer regulation away from public interest, is widely discussed, but its broader public consequences remain underexplored. We explore the relationship between perceived regulatory capture, public trust and pro‐environmental behaviors using online survey data in China. Findings show that perceived material and information capture (the latter measured with a single scenario‐based proxy) have significant negative associations with public trust in local ( b  = −0.154, −0.105) and central government ( b  = −0.087, −0.064). Direct associations with non‐activist pro‐environmental behaviors in the public sphere are consistently negative and supported by bootstrapped confidence intervals across specifications (material: β  = −0.066 to −0.082; information: β  = −0.036 to −0.047), whereas several corresponding private sphere associations are not. Indirect associations are supported only in selected models. These findings highlight the public implications of regulatory capture, distinguishing material and information capture, and extend understanding of public trust and pro‐environmental behaviors.