Regime collapse without civil war: Explaining Bangladesh’s July 2024 uprising

Why do some episodes of mass anti-regime contention end in rapid regime collapse, while others produce authoritarian survival or civil war? This article explains why Bangladesh's July 2024 uprising culminated in the fall of the incumbent government and the installation of a civilian interim administration rather than prolonged armed conflict. It argues that repression severity alone cannot explain outcome variation in violent protest crises. Instead, trajectories depend on whether repression broadens mobilization, whether the coercive apparatus remains unified, and whether a credible nonviolent transition pathway emerges before armed actors can consolidate. The article uses a mixed-methods design combining cross-national comparative analysis of electoral autocracies with process tracing of Bangladesh's July 2024 crisis and transition. It shows that three mechanisms were central to the outcome: the military's studied neutrality at the decisive moment, the rapid expansion of protests from a student movement into a broad anti-regime coalition, and the institutional hollowing produced by prolonged partisan capture under the Awami League. Bangladesh is therefore best understood as a case of regime collapse that occurred before militarization. The article contributes to research on authoritarian breakdown, contentious politics, and civil-military relations by showing how coercive disengagement can produce regime change without civil war.