Reciprocity in International Law: Evidence from Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Abstract

What factors shape public opinion toward international law? Current research suggests that citizens respond strongly to negative cues, but have found limited effects for information about the potential benefits. We theorize that cues about the reciprocity of international law – that the parties face mutually enforceable obligations – can increase support. We evaluate our theory with a survey experiment in the United States (US) examining views towards Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a frequently used but controversial dispute settlement mechanism in international investment law. Two findings stand out. First, consistent with previous research, the public is more supportive of international law if their country is the initiator rather than the target of a dispute. Second, when their country is the target, information about the use of ISDS by US firms, which we refer to as specific reciprocity, appears to increase support. More diffuse cues of reciprocity, however, do not affect support. Overall, our findings provide evidence that specific reciprocity cues can increase support for international law even when one’s country faces potential costs.