Rawls and Nonhuman Animals

Abstract

Social and political systems are deeply impactful on nonhuman animals as well as profoundly dependent on them. As one acknowledges the reality of how political and economic systems have allowed humans to exploit domestic animals, obliterate wild animal habitats, wipe out species, and change entire climate patterns, one must begin to think about whether theories of justice are adequate to the task of critiquing these practices and guiding the transformation of political systems. John Rawls had very little to say about justice for nonhuman animals. Many philosophers argue that his political theory is incompatible with the view that nonhumans are directly owed justice. Other philosophers have attempted to extend his theoretical framework to include a conception of justice for nonhumans. In this chapter, the author explains and evaluates the most significant arguments for and against extending Rawls's theory of justice to nonhuman animals. Ultimately, the author argues that one can retain key features of Rawls's social contract theory and political liberalism while making room for justice for nonhuman animals.