DOI: 10.1177/00938548261456311 ISSN: 0093-8548

Procedural Efficiency at a Cost? Plea Bargaining, Sentencing Discounts, and Victim Compensation in Homicide Cases in Spain

Pablo Romero-Seseña, Laura Arantegui, Alba Marsol-Gutiérrez, Josep Maria Tamarit-Sumalla

This study examines the use and consequences of plea bargaining in homicide and murder cases adjudicated by Spanish Provincial Courts between 2018 and 2024. Drawing on a dataset of 2,586 convictions, the analysis assesses whether plea bargaining is associated with differences in prison length and compensation awarded to victims and identifies factors predicting its use. Results from covariance analyses indicate that plea-bargaining convictions are associated with shorter prison sentences and lower levels of compensation, even after controlling for legal factors related to offense severity. Logistic regressions show that plea bargaining is primarily driven by legal variables, while most extralegal characteristics play a limited role. These findings provide novel evidence on plea bargaining in violent crime in Spain, showing that its selective use requires monitoring, consideration of the recent reforms on the legal framework, and a shift toward a better integration of victims’ perspectives.

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