Politics of the Russian Constitutional Court

Abstract

This article examines the adaptive strategies of the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) under conditions of authoritarian consolidation. Whereas existing scholarship on courts in autocracies often focuses on why regimes tolerate judicial institutions, this article shifts attention to how courts themselves survive. Drawing on the case of the RCC, it argues that judicial adaptation is not merely reactive but involves active reshaping of internal procedures, jurisprudential strategies, and doctrinal frameworks. The article situates this transformation within the broader literature on internal judicial institutions, emphasizing the role of collegiality and coordination in enabling strategic restraint. The RCC’s evolution is traced through key episodes, including its role in legitimizing constitutional amendments in 2020 and its handling of politically sensitive petitions. These cases illustrate how the RCC repurposed procedural tools—such as ruling subgenres and docket management—to avoid confrontation with the executive while maintaining institutional coherence. The Secretariat emerges as a pivotal actor in filtering cases and shaping deliberations, facilitating a gradual shift toward a jurisprudential culture of restraint. Ultimately, the article shows that survival under autocracy requires more than external compliance; it demands internal institutional innovation. By examining the RCC’s adaptation from within, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of how constitutional courts navigate authoritarian pressures while preserving their formal existence and professional legitimacy.