Philosophical Analysis of Artificial Intelligence in the Era of Post-Classical Science: John Searle and Hubert Dreyfus

The subject of the study is the philosophical critique of the computational model of the mind in the context of post-nonclassical types of scientific rationality. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological critique of artificial intelligence and John Searle's analytical critique. Special attention is paid to the ontological foundations of human cognition, which fundamentally distinguish it from machine information processing. The object of the study is the problem of the boundaries of formalizing thought and the possibility of creating machine intelligence. The article analyzes key arguments against the reduction of consciousness to algorithmic procedures. The author demonstrates how the development of digital technologies calls into question classical epistemological models. The role of embodiment, situational involvement, and biological organization in the formation of genuine understanding is considered. Special attention is given to the distinction between the imitation of intelligent behavior and the presence of conscious experience. The methodology of the research is based on a comparative philosophical analysis of two traditions: continental phenomenology and analytical philosophy of mind. Conceptual analysis of key ontological differences between biological and technical knowledge is employed. The novelty of the study lies in the synthesis of Dreyfus's and Searle's arguments to substantiate the dual boundary of machine intelligence. The main conclusions of the conducted research are as follows. Technical systems are fundamentally devoid of bodily embeddedness in the world necessary for the formation of horizons of meaning. Machines lack the biological foundation capable of generating subjective experience. There exists an ontological, rather than a quantitative, gap between the simulation of rational activity and its genuine realization. Contemporary linguistic models confirm this position: they reproduce statistical correlations of signs but lack directedness toward the world. A particular contribution of the author to the research of the topic is the demonstration of the relevance of philosophical critique precisely during the period of technological success in AI. The recognition of the ontological difference between humans and machines becomes an ethical imperative in the context of the algorithmization of social decisions.