Phainesthai Formalised? Cogito, ergo ‘res’ sum in Conscious Agent Theory

Abstract

The problem of consciousness remains the most intractable question in the philosophy of mind. Scientific approaches to consciousness, in their effort to provide a systematic account, impose determinate structures. This methodological necessity encounters a dilemma: it seeks to define what is never self‐identical. This paper considers Conscious Agent Theory (CAT) within this broader challenge, assessing its attempt to model consciousness while rejecting materialist reductionism. In rendering consciousness as a structured agent, CAT fortifies the problem by generating a fundamental tension between self‐transcendence and reification. Engaging with phenomenology and existentialist thought, the paper explores how being‐for‐itself resists reduction. The challenge from embodiment reveals that CAT risks erasing the transcendence distinguishing consciousness from the world it discloses, or reinstating dualism. CAT's tendency towards reification entails a Cartesian inheritance, placing it in opposition to phenomenological accounts of consciousness as relational, and self‐transcending. This dialectical tension invites further discussion between scientific perspectives and phenomenology.