DOI: 10.3390/v18070699 ISSN: 1999-4915

Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus (ANDV): A Systematic Review of Transmission Dynamics, Viral Shedding, and Public Health Implications

Flavia Pennisi, Antonio Pinto, Stefania Borlini, Sabrina Caruccio, Giusy D’Alterio, Carlo Signorelli, Giovanni Rezza

Andes virus (ANDV) is the only hantavirus with well-documented evidence of person-to-person transmission. However, key parameters related to transmission timing, viral shedding, exposure contexts, and public health management remain incompletely defined. We conducted a systematic review in accordance with PRISMA 2020. MEDLINE/PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science were searched from database inception up to 14 May 2026. Eligible studies reported epidemiological, virological, clinical, or public health data relevant to ANDV infection, person-to-person transmission, viral shedding, and/or outbreak control. Thirty-three studies, including 17,204 individuals, 2221 laboratory-confirmed ANDV cases, and 135 documented secondary cases, were included. Person-to-person transmission was identified as a primary or co-occurring route in 20 papers. The median incubation period among ANDV cases was 20.8 days, and the median serial interval was 21.8 days (upper bounds near 40 days). Secondary attack rates were higher among sexual and other close contacts. ANDV RNA was consistently detected in blood and occasionally in saliva, respiratory secretions, urine, breast milk, and semen, although RNA detection alone does not necessarily imply infectious virus. Rare reports of culture-confirmed isolation of replication-competent virus support the biological plausibility of transmission via close mucosal or respiratory exposure. Unlike other hantaviruses, Andes virus can spread person to person through close contact, supporting prolonged monitoring and risk-stratified follow-up of high-risk contacts based on ANDV-specific epidemiological evidence. Possible recommendations, including post-discharge counselling regarding possible sexual transmission, remain provisional and require further evidence. Preparedness activities against outbreaks should also be implemented in non-endemic regions, while future research should prioritize prospective contact studies, standardized virological sampling, and genomic confirmation.

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