Performance Measurement Systems and Academic Managers’ Gaming Behavior

ABSTRACT

This study examines how academic managers operating under managerialist control translate performance measurement systems (PMSs) into local gaming practices within business schools. These systems, implemented under neoliberal and managerialist reforms, shape institutional governance by prioritizing research outputs, student satisfaction, and financial sustainability. Employing a managerialist perspective, this UK‐based qualitative study investigates gaming practices in a sample of research and teaching‐focused university business schools. It draws on semi‐structured interviews with academic managers involved in such practices and with non‐managerial academics who observed and experienced these managerial practices. The findings relevant to university business schools internationally reveal that managers strategically manipulate PMS frameworks through ambiguous evaluation criteria, selective contract allocations, and targeted recruitment practices to maximize institutional performance metrics. Additionally, teaching and research standards are increasingly shaped by consumer‐driven metrics, leading to grade inflation and a transactional student–teacher dynamic. By shifting the analytical focus from individual academics to institutional decision‐makers, the study reveals the unintended consequences of PMS‐driven business school governance and calls for higher education policy reforms that enhance transparency and mitigate distortive performance incentives.