Optimizing Stakeholder Conflict Resolution in Inclusive Urban Renewal Projects: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model Incorporating Fairness Preferences

Inclusive urban renewal requires balancing the interests of multiple stakeholders; however, many renewal projects stall due to interest conflicts, rooted in the long-standing marginalization of residents’ subjective fairness perceptions. This study introduces the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion model to characterize residents’ fairness preferences, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, developers, and residents, and uses MATLAB numerical simulations to reveal the influence of key parameters on system steady states. The findings show that: (1) the system admits eight pure-strategy equilibrium solutions, seven of which can evolve into evolutionarily stable strategies within specific parameter ranges; (2) the intensity of higher-level government accountability, residents’ policy-based compensation and subjective fairness perception, and penalties for developer violations all exert significant influence on the smooth implementation of inclusive urban renewal; and (3) various regulatory policies exhibit complementary and synergistic attributes, whereas any single governance instrument has inherent limitations. This study provides a reference for multi-stakeholder collaborative governance in inclusive urban renewal.