Operator‐Aware Encrypted Bilateral Teleoperation With Detection and Cancellation of False Data Injection Attacks

ABSTRACT

This study proposes an operator‐aware framework for secure bilateral teleoperation under encrypted control. False data injection (FDI) attacks pose severe threats to remote control systems, particularly when input motions vary in amplitude and frequency. To address this challenge, we design an algorithm that combines a real‐time base energy update with a detection and cancellation scheme for encrypted bilateral control. Furthermore, we introduce the novel security threat index (STI), which explicitly indicates whether detectability is guaranteed and provides operator‐facing feedback to enhance cyber resilience. Theoretical analysis establishes sufficient conditions under which the proposed method detects and cancels FDI attacks within a finite number of steps. Experimental results on a pneumatic bilateral control testbed demonstrate that the algorithm successfully detects and cancels attacks across diverse scenarios, while STI effectively visualizes the risk of detection failure. The main contributions of this study are threefold: the proposal of an operator‐aware framework for detecting and canceling FDI attacks under variable input motions, the introduction of the novel STI as the first operator‐facing indicator with theoretical guarantees of detectability, and the experimental validation of both the algorithm and STI on a realistic testbed.