Online-Channel Introduction and Residual-Capacity-Based Differentiated Pricing in Spent Power-Battery Recycling

This study investigates the effects of introducing a manufacturer-operated online recycling channel (hereafter “online channel”) and adopting a residual-capacity-based differentiated-pricing strategy in spent power-battery recycling. We develop a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game involving a manufacturer, a retailer, and consumers. We solve and compare the equilibrium decisions under four modes: the offline-only identical-pricing (SI) mode, the dual-channel identical-pricing (DI) mode, the offline-only differentiated-pricing (SH) mode, and the dual-channel differentiated-pricing (DH) mode. The results show that under the baseline model, the total collection volume under the dual-channel recycling mode is greater than that under the offline-only recycling mode, while the retailer’s offline collection volume is lower. This indicates that introducing an online channel expands total collection but diverts part of the retailer’s offline collection. Compared with uniform pricing under the same channel structure, differentiated pricing yields the same total collection volume but performs better in collecting batteries with high residual capacity, suggesting that it reallocates incentives toward high-residual-capacity batteries rather than increasing total collection. For mode preference, the manufacturer earns the highest profit under the DH mode, whereas the retailer achieves the highest profit under the SH mode. These results are further examined in several extended studies. The contributions are threefold. First, the study distinguishes the market-expansion effect of online recycling from the value-recognition effect of differentiated pricing. Second, the consistency and applicability boundaries of baseline conclusions are examined and proposed under operational costs, residual-capacity measurement errors, consumer differentiation, and piecewise-linear demand. Third, a feasible profit-sharing mechanism is developed to coordinate the conflict between the manufacturer’s and retailer’s mode preferences.