DOI: 10.3390/app16199446 ISSN: 2076-3417

Multi-Market Joint Optimization and Cooperative Benefit Allocation for Wind–PV–Thermal–Storage Aggregators Considering Battery Degradation Cost

Zhenxing Hu, Qiang Fu, Yong Peng, Taoxing Liu, Xueyong Ye, Changzheng Shao, Yi Zhang

High penetrations of wind and photovoltaic (PV) generation increase renewable-output uncertainty, balancing-market exposure, and the demand for flexible ancillary services. This paper proposes a multi-market stochastic optimization and cooperative benefit-allocation framework for a wind–PV–thermal–storage aggregator considering BESS degradation cost. A price-taking three-stage offering model is formulated for participation in the energy, spinning-reserve, frequency-regulation, peak-shaving, and balancing markets, with non-anticipative offer-curve construction, thermal-unit commitment, BESS intertemporal constraints, imbalance settlement, and equivalent-throughput degradation cost. A cooperative game is then constructed from the maximum expected net profits of all 15 non-empty resource coalitions. The strict Shapley value is retained as the benchmark, while a Shapley-based flexibility-adjusted allocation uses explicit leave-one-participant-out contribution indices and an individual-rationality-constrained adjustment parameter. For the representative test system, expected net profit increases from CNY 1.6433 million in Case 1 to CNY 1.7340 million in Case 5, a cumulative increase of 5.52%. BESS integration accounts for a 1.35% increase relative to Case 1, while subsequent expansion from the BESS-inclusive Case 2 to Case 5 provides a further 4.12% increase relative to Case 2. Scenario-number, ancillary-market-size, and degradation-cost sensitivity analyses show limited variation in the main economic results over the tested ranges. The strict Shapley allocation slightly violates BESS individual rationality; the final minimum adjustment, α = 1.22 × 10−4, restores individual rationality for all participants. The ordinary core is empty because of a small CNY 367.97 non-superadditivity gap, and the final allocation attains the individual-rationality-constrained least-core bound.