Monitoring the turnover of state and municipal agricultural land: structural shifts and dysfunctions

This article presents the results of an analytical study of state and municipal agricultural land turnover, characterizing the actual format of resource distribution across the country. The dominant role of leasehold relations in land rights turnover is identified. An integrated market contraction is revealed, confirmed by a quantitative reduction in supply, demand, and final contracts. This indicates a decline in the resource's investment attractiveness, which runs counter to the systemic policy of private property development and the development of the "effective owner" concept. Agricultural land turnover is also identified as dependent on external institutional influences, which is confirmed in practice by a systemic failure in transactions during the transition from the declarative principle of land rights acquisition to administrative resource distribution using market mechanisms (auctions). Despite the use of distribution instruments classified as market instruments (land auctions), agricultural land turnover does not exhibit the full spectrum of market transaction characteristics. This is confirmed by the discrepancy between the value of use and possession rights and property rights when calculating capitalization ratios, as well as emerging trends in opposing value dynamics. Based on the analysis, the authors identified dysfunctions in distribution and pricing within the functioning of the turnover institution, which is tasked with the primary tasks of effectively distributing land and reducing the share of unused resources across the country.