Misinterpretive Frames and Epistemic Contamination

Interpretive frames guide how we interpret information. This article concerns the way in which our shared interpretive frames—such as metaphors, narratives, scripts, and stereotypes—may produce misunderstanding in ways that sustain injustice. I relate the role of frames to structural views of understanding in order to put forward an analysis of misinterpretive frames: frames that systematically produce misunderstanding. I contrast mere lack of understanding, whereby someone lacks apparent intelligibility, with cases of more substantive misunderstanding, whereby someone has a mistaken “sense” of understanding. I begin by introducing the structural view of understanding in order to present a structural characterization of misunderstanding. I highlight that frames guide how we structure information, and so distorting frames lead to misunderstanding. I highlight two ways in which possessing misinterpretive frames is distinctively epistemically pernicious: concealed incompetence and epistemic contamination. In the former, the mistaken sense of understanding conferred by grasping an inapt interpretive structure obstructs recognition of one’s own epistemic failures. In the latter, deploying a misinterpretive frame to interpret new evidence renders it misleading, polluting otherwise valuable epistemic resources. Finally, through an examination of naturalization and normalization, I show how these distorting frames may obscure and perpetuate injustice.