Mill’s Pragmatism on Free Speech and Inquiry

This paper presents a pragmatist interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s arguments defending freedom of expression, drawing a comparison between Mill’s arguments in On Liberty and the work of Charles Peirce. I argue that Mill’s commitment to fallibilism in his argument for supporting free expression is more closely aligned with pragmatist concerns for collaborative inquiry than the liberal concern of mediating competing perspectives. This interpretation is supported by key contingencies in Mill’s argument, framed by his assumption that freedom of opinion facilitates a pursuit of truth. Exposure of such contingencies provides the basis for a more precise theoretical groundwork for outlining limits of free speech without necessary reference to Mill’s harm principle, with freedom of opinion being contingent upon said opinion’s pragmatic contribution to collaborative inquiry in the collective pursuit of truth. Freedom of opinion entails being receptive to genuine doubt and remaining open to revising our personal commitments and opinions.