Military operations of the Voronezh Corps of the Southern Army in November - December 1918

The subject of the research is the combat actions of the Voronezh Corps of the Southern Army in November – December 1918 on the Liski direction. The object of the study is the organizational structure, personnel composition, logistical support, and operational capabilities of the Corps as an element of the White movement in Southern Russia. The authors examine in detail aspects such as the progress of offensive operations of the 1st Infantry Division, the reasons for the failure of the first attempt to capture the Liski station on November 18, subsequent retreat, and disintegration of units. Special attention is paid to the condition of the officer and enlisted personnel, the moral-psychological climate, relationships with the Cossack command and the local population. The work also analyzes the influence of the Northern Front Headquarters of the Don Army on the planning of operations, as well as the role of external factors – the German occupation, the policies of Ataman Krasnov, and the confrontation with the units of the 12th Rifle Division of the Red Army. The study is based on the principles of historicism and objectivity, employing methods of critical source analysis, comparative-historical and retrospective analysis, as well as a systematic approach to assessing military-political factors. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that, for the first time, a complete chronology of the battles on the Liski direction has been reconstructed based on archival documents from the Russian State Military Archives (RGVA) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), which had not previously been subject to special study. The authors argue that the collapse of the Corps was a logical result not only of internal disintegration and technical weakness but also of the erroneous strategy of the front headquarters, which imposed unattainable tasks without reserves and supplies. This led to the fall of the army and front flank. The conclusions refute simplified assessments of the Southern Army as inherently incapable of combat, showing that individual units (such as the Siberian Battalion) demonstrated resilience; however, the systemic contradictions of the White movement – social detachment, repressive policies, and lack of a unified ideology – made defeat inevitable.