Military enforcement of conventional arms control and conflict termination agreements in Europe

When and under what conditions do adversarial conventional arms control (CAC) and conflict termination agreements in Europe include explicit military use-of-force enforcement mechanisms? Treaties rarely feature clear, formal enforcement mechanisms as states typi- cally prefer flexibility in how agreements are enforced — especially if they themselves could be subject to the enforcement. However, some agreements incorporate language that permits the use of force in the event of non-compliance. This provides a casus belli should a state or coalition need to take military action against an agreement violator. This article hypothesized that an overwhelming victory/defeat is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to include agreement enforcement mechanisms based on a combination of states’ rational choice considerations including bargaining, lack of trust, and security prioritization. The analysis of 46 agreements related to Europe from 1918 to the present, conducted through qualitative content analysis and case comparison methods, largely supports the hypothesis. Ten agreements support the hypothesis while four do not.