DOI: 10.12737/2587-6295-2026-10-2-274-287 ISSN: 2587-6295

Military coups in Turkey as one of the approaches of the elites' coming to power

Louai Youssef

The military establishment has shaped Turkey's political trajectory since the Ottoman era, when armed forces secured territorial expansion and consolidated imperial authority. After the First World War, Western armies occupied Anatolia, and the military responded by defeating these forces to establish the modern Turkish Republic. Victory elevated the army to exceptional prestige among citizens, transforming it into the guardian of secular governance and constitutional order. This research examines how the military functions within Turkish political life and evaluates the probability of future coups. An interdisciplinary methodology combines analytical techniques with chronological historical processing to substantiate the findings. Turkish martial traditions extend to antiquity, though the armed forces' active political engagement during Ottoman expansion reinforced these tendencies considerably (the institution accumulated both symbolic capital and practical governing experience across centuries). Four coups during the second half of the twentieth century demonstrated the military's determination to preserve its influence over civilian politics. The Justice and Development Party's ascent brought fundamental change. Constitutional amendments enacted by the ruling party stripped the armed forces of numerous political prerogatives, curtailing authority that generals had exercised for decades. Turkish society fractured along deep ideological lines; relations between elected leaders and military elites deteriorated steadily until tensions exploded in the failed coup attempt of July 2016. This article contributes theoretically by systematizing information about Turkey's military interventions while tracing their causes and consequences for the broader political system. The practical dimension involves forecasting future possibilities. Another coup attempt may occur by 2028 under particular conditions: should President R.T. Erdogan pursue constitutional amendments extending his tenure, or should his eventual successor lack comparable power and control over Turkey's political establishment.

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