Migrants’ Religious Rights in the Algorithmic City: A European Legal Perspective

European cities increasingly use digital platforms, predictive analytics and artificial intelligence to allocate welfare, regulate mobility, plan public space and support security. This article examines how these systems reshape migrants’ effective enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief. Using doctrinal and comparative legal analysis, informed by interdisciplinary scholarship, it connects European human-rights law, EU data-protection and equality law, the Artificial Intelligence Act, and scholarship on urban religious diversity. The analysis identifies three recurring risks: the digital invisibility of minority religious needs in planning and service design; proxy and intersectional discrimination in welfare, housing, education and integration systems; and chilling effects produced by biometric and data-intensive surveillance of religious dress, assembly and worship. Documented institutional practices and adjudicated cases are expressly distinguished from hypothetical legal stress tests used to identify foreseeable pathways of rights interference. The article also shows that urban technology can improve access, coordination and participation when governed through transparent, accessible and contestable procedures. It proposes a rights-based model centred on infrastructural neutrality, religion-sensitive impact assessment, participatory co-design, data minimisation, meaningful explanation, accountable human review and effective remedies. It argues that religious freedom in the algorithmic city depends not only on the legality of individual decisions, but also on the design and governance of the digital infrastructures through which urban membership is recognised and administered. The European focus is methodologically deliberate: the Council of Europe and EU systems supply distinct yet interacting standards for digitally mediated municipal action. The article specifies when a technological disadvantage engages Article 9 ECHR rather than principally privacy, equality or administrative law, differentiates risks by migration status, and tests the proposed principle against two legally bounded institutional examples.