Local Economic Dependence, Official Rank, and Accountability in China: Evidence From Coal Mine Accidents

This article examines accountability after coal mine accidents in China using an original dataset of 968 accidents involving 3,503 government officials. It analyzes how accident severity, official rank, local economic dependence on coal, and the strengthening of coal mine safety supervision shape both the probability and the severity of accountability. The results show that more severe accidents are more likely to trigger sanction and result in harsher punishment. Higher-ranking officials are less likely to receive severe sanctions, and the effect of accident severity on their accountability probability is comparatively weaker. The findings also show that the impact of local coal dependence on accountability conditions on strengthening of coal mine safety supervision. Before 2003, greater local coal dependence weakened the responsiveness of accountability to accident severity and widened rank-based disparities in sanction severity, largely through harsher punishment of lower-ranking officials. After 2002, these coal-related hierarchical distortions were substantially reduced, although the general disparity sanction severity across administrative ranks persisted. These findings contribute to the study of official accountability in China by showing how bureaucratic rank, local economy, and regulatory environment jointly shape accountability outcomes.