Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge

Abstract

This book provides an account of justice in the distribution of knowledge. It argues that knowledge is a good no less important than other goods—like income, wealth, and basic liberties—for human flourishing, political equality, and just legislation and that the distribution of the opportunity to acquire certain kinds of knowledge is a matter of justice. Accordingly, institutions that produce and disseminate knowledge and enable people to acquire it have duties of justice. These institutions make up the epistemic basic structure of a society and must satisfy two requirements. First, they should provide citizens with a fair opportunity to gain the knowledge they need to deliberate about their individual good, the common good, and how to pursue them. Second, they should produce and disseminate the knowledge that public officials and citizens need to comply with the requirements of justice. An unfair and unreliable epistemic basic structure that does not serve the knowledge needs of all is an injustice in itself and facilitates other injustices. Bringing political philosophy into conversation with philosophy of science, and drawing on extensive empirical research, the book diagnoses structural forces that privilege some groups’ knowledge needs, compromise the reliability of knowledge production, and undermine warranted trust. Through real-world cases and evidence from across disciplines, it shows how distributive epistemic injustice limits access to essential goods, entrenches political inequality, and hinders the pursuit of justice. It offers a unified, non-ideal framework and proposes reforms aimed at remedying existing injustices and securing a more just society.