International mediation in an asymmetric conflict: The American structural model and Russia’s normative and facilitative role in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement

The article examines international mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement under conditions of asymmetric conflict. It compares the American structural model and Russia’s normative and facilitative role in terms of normative framework, acceptability, influence instruments, and capacity to shape the negotiation environment. The methodological basis is a qualitative comparison of two cases, drawing on scholarly literature, UN documents, foreign policy materials, and analytical reports. Particular attention is paid to how external actors accompany negotiations and affect the distribution of political opportunities. The article argues that the American model represents structural mediation. It is reflected in the ability of the United States to shape regional, institutional, security, and symbolic conditions of the settlement: from Camp David and Oslo to the Abraham Accords, Jerusalem and settlements, and post-war governance mechanisms in Gaza. This model has considerable influence, but operates in close connection with Israel and is accompanied by low Palestinian trust. In contrast, the Russian approach is not conceptualized as an independent structural model. It is defined as a limited normative and facilitativerole based on international legal argumentation, support for the two-state solution, calls for direct dialogue, multilateral formats, and channels with Palestinian, Israeli, and regional actors. Its capacity is limited by the lack of direct leverage, American support for Israel, ties with Iran and Hamas, and Palestinian fragmentation. The study refines criteria for evaluating mediation under asymmetry. It concludes that mediation effectiveness depends not only on neutrality, but also on acceptability, leverage, and the capacity to prevent “facts on the ground” from becoming conditions for future negotiations.