Indonesia's Search for Network Centrality in the Indo‐Pacific

ABSTRACT

This article examines the evolution of Indonesia's Indo‐Pacific policy through the lenses of tactical hedging and network centrality. It argues that, since Marty Natalegawa's 2013 proposal for an Indo‐Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (IPTFC), Indonesia has used foreign policy doctrines not merely as declaratory statements, but as strategic signals to test reactions, preserve flexibility, and cultivate regional influence. Tracing the shift from the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) to the Indo‐Pacific Cooperation Concept (IPCC) and, ultimately, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‐Pacific (AOIP), the article shows that Indonesia shifted from seeking a central role on its own its own to reinforcing ASEAN Centrality as a more viable means of shaping regional order and pursuing network centrality. This recalibration was driven by domestic constraints, including weak policy coordination and limited institutional capacity, as well as intensifying great‐power rivalry. While the GMF failed to generate durable network centrality, AOIP enabled Indonesia to embed its strategic preferences within ASEAN and gain broader acceptance. Yet, ASEAN‐based network centrality remains only partially institutionalized, leaving ASEAN‐centered approach vulnerable to implementation gaps, uneven external support, and the possible dilution caused by expanding engagements beyond ASEAN under Prabowo.