Incorporating authority perception, economic status and behavioural response in infectious disease control

Abstract

We introduce a multi-population mean field game framework to examine how economic status and authority perception shape vaccination and social distancing decisions under different epidemic control policies. We conducted a survey to inform our model and stratify the population into six groups by income and perception of authority, capturing behavioural heterogeneity. Individuals choose socialization and vaccination levels to optimize objectives such as minimizing treatment costs, complying with social distancing guidelines if they are authority-followers, or reducing losses from decreased social interactions if they are authority-indifferents, alongside economic costs. Public health authorities influence behaviour through social distancing guidelines and vaccination costs. We characterize the Nash equilibrium via a forward–backward differential equation system, provide its mathematical analysis and numerically solve it. Our findings reveal a trade-off between social distancing and vaccination. Under stricter guidelines that target both susceptible and infected individuals, followers reduce both socialization and vaccination levels, while indifferents increase socialization owing to followers’ preventative measures. Adaptive guidelines targeting infected individuals effectively reduce infections and narrow the gap between low- and high-income groups, while lower vaccination costs incentivize vaccination among low-income groups. Trust-building remains critical in epidemic mitigation, underscoring the importance of data-informed, game-theoretical models for understanding complex human responses to mitigation policies.