How Theists Can Answer the “Why be Moral?” Question: An Indirect Reason‐Generation Account

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I give a new type of theistic answer to the “Why be moral?” question. After briefly clarifying the version of the question I'm concerned with, as well as extant theistic answers to the question, I argue for a new kind of answer. Roughly, while on standard answers, future (post death) benefits directly generate present reason to be moral, on my view, they only do so indirectly. On my view, we only have present reason to be moral because we will have reason to be moral in the afterlife. I propose a principle of reason inheritance that would justify this proposal. I also argue for my view, over the standard view: it alone can account for Prichard's Dilemma. Finally, I show how my proposal entails two interesting theses: a bodily eschaton and a loose type of purgatory.