How subnational political entities can gain and exercise power in defense and security policy: The case of Greenland

This article examines how subnational political entities can gain and exercise power over defense and security policy. Although some scholars still claim that subnational political entities play no role in defense and security policy, several studies have argued otherwise. However, these studies have typically focused on one type of power used by subnational political entities. I argue for a broader approach to the power of subnational political entities within the defense and security policy domain. I create an analytical framework that highlights three types of power—legal claims, compellence, and normative appeals—that subnational political entities exercise within this policy domain. I demonstrate the value of this framework by showing that Greenland has used all three types of power in different settings to obtain at least three types of ends (power over defense and security policy, power over other issues, and economic benefits). I argue that this analytical framework provides a language for studying the multitude of types of power, ends, and settings at play and that it can serve as a starting point for further research about the power of subnational political entities in the defense and security policy domain.