Hegemonic decline and grand strategy: A variegated framework

Abstract

How do hegemons respond to relative decline? The existing literature suggests that declining hegemons either cling to the status quo through preventive war and other expansionist measures or retrench. This article argues that hegemonic decline produces incentives for both forms of action. More specifically, I provide a variegated framework that distinguishes between mild and acute decline as two distinct situations through which declining hegemons may pass. Mild hegemonic decline, defined as the diffusion of new technologies from the hegemon to other great powers, incentivises an expansionist strategy by heightening economic competition and strategic vulnerability. However, acute hegemonic decline, defined as a hegemon’s inability to lead a new round of innovative technologies, leads to grand strategic contraction by reducing the scope of the hegemon’s interests and its material capacity to sustain them. The variegated framework is elaborated and tested by analysing Great Britain’s grand strategy from 1880 to 1939.