Having Meanings in View

Abstract

The book lays the groundwork for a novel account of rule-following which is both philosophically substantive and partially reductive. The account the book proposes is philosophically substantive in contrast with the kind of discourses that exemplify a quietist approach to philosophy. It is partially reductive inasmuch as it proposes to reconstruct the phenomenon of rule-following out of materials that do not presuppose linguistic meanings or conceptual contents, though without depriving itself altogether of properly intentional resources. In that respect, it threads a middle ground between non-reductionist and fully reductionist accounts. It clears up and pursues a conceptual path which, until now, has been largely missed—and seldom explored—but which offers a genuine and compelling alternative to existing accounts. The book proposes to answer two questions in detail: (i) Which feature of meaningful signs are we responsive to in cases of rule-following? and (ii) What is the relation between these signs and our responses to them in such cases? It does so through a critical engagement with the writings of three authors: McDowell, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein.