Good‐For and Good‐Simpliciter

ABSTRACT

One fundamental question in value theory concerns the nature of final value: is having final value a matter of being good for someone ¸ in the sense of benefiting them (also called prudential value), or is it a matter of being good ‐simpliciter (also called impersonal or Moorean value)? Or do both kinds of value exist—are some things good‐for and others good‐simpliciter? In this article, I present the terms of this debate and clarify its stakes and ambiguities before examining two families of arguments which attempt to settle it. Much of the debate consists of conceptual arguments, which take issue with either good‐for or good‐simpliciter as concepts and which typically try to show that one or the other is either incoherent or superfluous. These conceptual arguments are illuminating, but they have not yet proven decisive. I therefore suggest that we might progress by further developing substantive arguments, which appeal to our actual considered judgments about the value things have and which then examine what properties are required to account for this value, and I discuss three strategies for pursuing such substantive arguments.