Globalization, Asymmetrical Criminal Markets, and the Formation of Transnational Crime Alliances

Abstract

Drawing on the Politics of Illicit Global Economy, this exploratory piece examines the transformation of transnational organized crime (TOC) and the underlying theoretical limitations in explaining the differentiated effects of globalization on illicit markets, focusing on the formation of criminal alliances and value chains, and the relationship between asymmetry and violence. The fragmentation of large cartels and the rise of flexible criminal actors have driven a structural reorganization of organized crime, fueled by the growing demand for illicit goods and services in high-income economies, the increasing sophistication of supply chains, and the support of global financial systems that facilitate cross-border transactions.

From the perspective of International Studies, the argument situates illicit markets within broader debates in International Relations (IR), TOC, and International Political Economy (IPE) on globalization, power asymmetries, and the role of non-state actors in shaping transnational governance structures. Rather than treating organized crime as a purely domestic security issue, the article conceptualizes criminal networks as transnational actors embedded in global economic processes. In doing so, it contributes to IR debates by demonstrating how illicit markets mirror the organization of global production networks, revealing how globalization generates parallel systems of cooperation that operate beyond the control of state and international institutions.

The analysis further contributes to IPE debates on global inequality by showing how asymmetric globalization concentrates benefits in consumer markets—primarily in the Global North—while production, trafficking routes, and enforcement risks are concentrated in the Global South. These dynamics expose lower-tier actors to higher levels of violence and state intervention. Such structural inequalities help explain the persistence of violence and the resilience of illicit markets despite intensified state control efforts.

To capture the unequal relationships among participants, this piece advances the concept of asymmetrical illicit markets, defined as transnational economic configurations of illegal exchange in which the stages of production, financing, transportation, distribution, and consumption are geographically segmented. This segmentation generates structurally unequal relationships among criminal actors, as control over high-value segments—particularly logistics, coordination, and access to end markets—enables the concentration of rents and decision-making power. This perspective provides a conceptual foundation for future quantitative research on protection costs, armament, and other factors shaping illicit market dynamics. Ultimately, the article contributes to ongoing debates in IR and IPE by highlighting how power asymmetries embedded in globalization shape the governance, organization, and coercive practices of TOC.